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Chinese Agricultural Policy Can Move World Markets 
 
As was noted in my introduction, it has been several months since I have dealt day to day 
with grain and China. Although, in an unexpected way it has helped my understanding of 
China’s grain sector to come to work on cotton analysis and policy here in Washington.  
As many of you know, the United States is currently defending itself in a WTO case 
brought by Brazil against our farm payments.  The crux of Brazil’s claim against our 
marketing loan, countercyclical and direct payments is that these programs suppressed 
world prices from marketing year 1999-2002, and will continue to suppress them in 
coming years.  When we looked at the data however, it was pretty clear that it wasn’t the 
United States that was the main driver for lower prices in this time period but rather it 
was China--in particular a change in Chinese policy in 1999.  After implementing a price 
support program that allowed government cotton stocks and state-run bank debt to grow 
to huge levels, the Chinese Government had to cut its losses and systematically dump its 
stocks on the world market in the form of raw and processed cotton.  You in the grain 
industry know that a very similar scenario was repeated in China for corn, wheat and 
rice, as the policies for the individual commodities were all interconnected.    
 
My time working on the Brazil case has driven home to me how enormous is the capacity 
for Chinese policy to affect the world’s major agricultural markets.  China is after all the 
world’s largest agricultural producer.  The Chinese policies significantly distorted world 
production in grains and cotton throughout the middle 1990’s and have depressed world 
prices for the last 4 years.  So any consideration of our future grain trade, or any 
agricultural trade with China for that matter, must look closely at implications of Chinese 
agricultural policy. 
 
The Economic Forces Moving China’s Grain Sector  
 
To look at policy, I want to first look at what is generally accepted as the key forces at 
work in China’s grain market.  I think the consensus is that China, like other developing 
countries, is consuming more and more livestock products as its per capita GDP 
increases, and accordingly its demand for feed grains is growing quickly.  There is some 
counterbalance to this because consumption of rice and wheat as food staples is 
declining.   However, assuming China continues to grow at its current clip, in the long 
term the prospects for grain imports is good.  China’s arable land on a per capita basis is 
relatively limited, one-sixth that of the United States, and the demand on the land for 
other crops particularly for vegetables and fruit, is great.  Further, limited water supplies 
in the arid north where most of the corn and wheat are grown is increasingly constraining 
production.   Since China abandoned its price support policy in 1999, grain production, particularly in 
wheat and rice has dropped close to 20 percent.   China continues to draw down the huge 
stocks they built up in the 1990’s, but most agree that China will probably need at some 
point in the future to import a great deal of its grain needs-both directly and in the form 
of livestock products.  The USDA baseline sees China switching from a 10 million metric 
ton grain exporter to a 10 million metric ton importer within 10 years. And indeed recent 
news that China intends to reduce its corn exports would seem to confirm what USDA 
has indicated in its data for some time-that Chinese grain production is already falling 
well short of consumption.   
 
The question is, however, once the grain stocks are finally reduced to normal levels as 
they should be within a few years and China becomes as it was in the middle 1990’s a big 
importer of grain are we destined to see a repeat of the policy decisions that hurt markets 
over the past four years.   Or, even failing that particular trauma, how else could Chinese 
policy affect grain trade. 
 
Agricultural Policy Objectives 
 
To look at this question, it is necessary to understand the objectives of Chinese 
agricultural policy.   Chinese leaders have a concern, as do our leaders, in maintaining 
farmers income.  I think the press, and some analysts even, over-dramatize this-
perpetuating a vision of a huge gap between rural and urban China.  The Chinese 
government in its concern with farmer incomes is simply responding to the problems any 
country experiences as it makes the difficult transition from an agrarian to an industrial 
economy.  Indeed I see some parallels between the post-collectivization development of 
China’s farm policies and our own efforts over the years.   
 
China also has a concern historically in “self-sufficiency” in grains.  Although my 
impression is that as time passes, this becomes less and less of a concern, it doubtlessly 
was key to the policy decisions of the 1990’s, and recently, as stocks have come down, 
we have heard Chinese officials again talk about self-sufficiency. 
 
Finally, people frequently ignore that China, as it develops, has potential as an 
agricultural exporter itself.  Even though its per capita arable land relative to the United 
States, Canada, and Australia may be limited, compared to other Asian countries it does 
much better.  Its location combined with cheap labor makes horticultural and livestock 
exports to nearby countries very attractive.  It also has an urban population that has 
become accustomed to cheap food.  So, fostering efficiency in agriculture to promote 
exports and keep domestic food prices low is also definitely a key government objective.  
 
A Repeat of the 1990’s? 
 
These objectives are really not all that different from what they were in the 1990’s.  So 
will we repeat the roller coaster ride caused by China’s grain procurement program in the 
1990’s?  The program is still on the books, although the procurement prices have for the 
last five years been set so low that they have become largely meaningless.   When the government gets rid of their current grain stocks, will they be tempted to reintroduce the 
higher procurement prices and start stocks growing again?  My feeling is that they have 
learned their lesson (as we did with our grain stocks crisis in the 1980’s) and will not let 
their stock situation get out of hand again.  China is after all still a developing country 
that can ill afford costly farm programs.    Loans given to maintain the agricultural price 
support program of the 1990’s played a big role in the very serious problems that China’s 
state-run banks continue to face.  Also, the Chinese farmer has more alternatives to grain 
these days.  Thriving demand for horticultural and livestock products is reducing the 
pressure to insure good returns for grain.  
 
Similarly I think that budget worries and the sheer number of Chinese farmers is going to 
make it difficult for very many years for China to adopt a U.S.-style decoupled program 
that would avoid production distortions while maintaining farmers incomes.  
 
Controlling Trade to Meet Agricultural Policy Goals 
 
So, as a practical matter, is any income-enhancing agricultural policy available to China?   
Although China may not have the financial resources to sustain domestic price supports 
or develop a production-neutral farmer income support program, Chinese officials still 
realize the value of trade restrictions in meeting policy goals.  China has long restricted 
trade and financial flows in hopes of meeting policy aims.  Further, even though now 
they are members of the WTO, some of their policies and practices may contravene WTO 
commitments.   
 
Most importantly for the grain industry, ever since China found itself saddled with huge 
grain stocks in the late 1990’s, it has subsidized corn exports as the best and cheapest 
way to get rid of these stocks with the minimum harm to domestic prices.  When it 
entered the WTO at the end of 2001, it continued the subsidies even though their WTO 
accession agreement explicitly forbids this.  They have also imposed a VAT on all grain 
imports that is for the most part not levied on domestic grain.  The effect is that for grain 
(and indeed almost all agricultural imports) they have been able to keep a 10-15 percent 
buffer between imported and domestic prices.  In areas outside of grain, the Chinese have 




Chinese officials justify these actions based largely on a belief that developed countries 
often fail to meet their WTO commitments at China’s expense.  And in China’s defense, 
they probably have some legitimate complaints.  Japan has restricted imports of Chinese 
poultry meat and vegetables on some questionable sanitary and phytosanitary grounds.  
Also, the Europeans have shut off all Chinese imports of livestock and aquatic products 
for drug residue levels, even though the United States has continued to import Chinese 
aquatic products despite having the same standards.  These actions by Europe and Japan 
apparently directly led to China’s controls on chicken imports, and the Chinese, 
reasoning that such restrictions hurt demand for grain, probably use it internally to justify 
continuing export subsidies.   
Of course the United States has had similar problems with both of these trading partners.  
However, I feel we and most other WTO members have tried to keep our responses to 
unfair trade practices at least transparent.  For instance some may argue about the 
fairness or economic validity of our anti-dumping legislation, but the process is open.  If 
another country wants to challenge what we do in the WTO the paper trail is there.  This 
is an outgrowth of our legal system which requires a strict adherence to rules and 
procedures .   
 
For China, the reaction is different.  For the corn export subsidies, China simply says that 
they are giving VAT rebates, which are indeed acceptable under the WTO.  The numbers, 
though, don’t add up, particularly considering that no VAT is paid on domestic corn used 
for feed.  However we have no idea of the mechanism for the payouts. It appears to be a 
transaction between the quasi-public grain bureaus that procure and hold grain and the 
state-run agricultural bank.  Nothing is public.  By contrast our export subsidy program 
when it has been used for grain in the past was completely transparent.   
 
For the quota on chicken imports, Chinese officials simply say that there is no quota-that 
the mechanism blamed for restrictions on imports is indeed “automatic” for any importer 
who needs it and in no way limits imports.  They feel no need to explain why imports 
have dropped precipitously and domestic prices have risen for the chicken paws and 
wingtips that are the bulk of imports.   
 
These actions create a real problem for trading partners. We can argue about whether a 
country’s policy is contrary to the WTO or what the impact of a country’s policy is on 
world trade, but it is difficult if not impossible to argue that a country’s policy is simply 
not what they say it is.  
 
What is frustrating for me when talking to the Chinese however is that they feel that our 
system is really not any different than theirs.  To them our anti-dumping legislation and 
our sanitary and phytosanitary procedures are just different although equivalent means to 
the same ends as their practices.   To me it is important for grain or any kind of trade that 
we work to reverse this perception amongst the Chinese.  They need to make their 
process transparent and truly governed by the laws and rules they have set down.  If the 
Chinese would lay out in the public domain the details of the process by which they 
reimburse their exporters for corn exports, then we could start a discussion on whether 
they are WTO compliant.  Now we are in a situation where they can complain, and do at 
some length, about our trade actions but we can really say little about theirs.     
 
Chinese Officials Realize the Value of Agricultural Imports 
 
This is not to say that the Chinese Government is entirely capricious in its dealings with 
trade.  I believe its officials increasingly understand that allowing some degree of free 
trade will help them achieve their objectives in the agricultural sector.  The Chinese 
realize that if they let there own economy get too out of step with the rest of the world, it 
will hurt them---particularly in the all important export sector.  As already noted China uses differential application of its VAT to keep domestic grain prices 10 to 15 percent 
above world prices. The Chinese are happy with this situation because it gives their 
farmers fairly high prices while still maintaining the competitiveness of Chinese exports 
like poultry meat, which can obtain a VAT rebate.  Going beyond this level of protection, 
Chinese officials probably feel, would jeopardize the export sector and cause an 
unacceptable drag on the rest of the Chinese economy in the form of higher food prices.  
 
What is interesting to contemplate, and this is looking hopefully down the road a bit, is 
what will happen if China, even with this premium, runs up against the tariff rate quota 
maximums for grains (about 5 percent of consumption) agreed to in their WTO 
agreement.  Will the Chinese Government allow prices to rise further domestically or 
instead raise the quota limits to allow more imports?  My feeling is that the need to 
maintain exports and low food costs will prompt China to allow imports beyond the 
quotas.    Here, China’s lack of transparency and loose compliance with regulation may 
work to our advantage.  In support of my views, the Chinese have just in the past few 
months run up against the quota limit for cotton and have quite readily increased it, 
simply because the textile export industry needs it.  I would also argue that despite 
biotech concerns and pressure from farmers, China has in the end not significantly 
curtailed soybean imports which seem to yearly set new records.  I think this is in 
response to the needs of China’s huge crushing industry, and the need to keep feed and 
vegetable oil prices in line. 
 
Chinese Agricultural Exports and Grain Imports 
 
As you can see, the future of grain policy and imports is heavily dependant on 
development of China’s own exports.  If China continues to encounter barriers, justified 
or not, in the development of livestock exports, market forces will reduce China’s grain 
demand and policies will be followed that increase the level of protection given their 
grain farmers and industry.   This extends to Chinese horticultural exports as well.  To the 
extent China cannot find markets for their horticultural products, the pressure to institute 
policies that maintain domestic grain will be greater.  Although I have mentioned the EU 
and Japan before, certainly the Chinese also complain about our anti-dumping and other 
safeguard measures, and our at times slow regulatory approvals for imports.  Of course 
on the other hand, even with all these restrictions on exports, China would still have a 
huge trade surplus with the United States. 
 
Chinese Grain Imports Will Develop If World Trade Develops 
 
So, what do I feel in the end will happen.  In the long run I am optimistic. I believe the 
fundamental economics is there for China to become a significant net importer of grain.  
The key is whether the trade environment (not just for grain but for all trade) both in 
China and the world will develop so as to let this happen.  Of course the past couple of 
years have been rough for the development of free trade but I am still confident that the 
power of the argument for free trade will prevail and that grain trade with China will 
benefit. In the end, it is after all in everyone’s, and in particular China’s best interest.  
 